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FOURTH AND LONG: HOW THE WELL-ESTABLISHED
SYSTEM OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION POSES A
SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF
THE NFL
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Football League (NFL) is facing a looming threat to
its financial stability because of the well-established and prevalent
legal regime of workmen's compensation.' Professional football is,
like all contact sports, "inherently dangerous," yet nothing prevents
current players-or former players-from filing claims to seek the
benefits under a controlling workers' compensation regime. 2 While
such claims may, in some cases, be minimal, the proliferation of
long-term injuries, many of which do not manifest for years after a
player's career has ended, 3 as well as the long-term medical treatment
plans that necessarily follow, have the potential to impute liability
upon NFL teams that may approach millions of dollars annually. 4
The severity of this threat was realized in Matthews v. NFL
Management Council, where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit helped "pave the way" for future players to claim benefits
under a state's codified workers' compensation regime,
notwithstanding contractual arbitration clauses that purport to compel
players to pursue all workers' compensation claims through an instate arbitration process. 5 Between 1983 and 2002, Hall of Fame
offensive lineman Bruce Matthews enjoyed an illustrious, nineteen
year NFL career, playing for the Houston Oilers and the Tennessee
Titans. 6 In 2008, Matthews filed for workers' compensation benefits

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Darren Rovell, Teams Face Workers ° Camp Threat, ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/espn/otVstory/_/id/8316657 /nfl-teams-facing-large-bills-relatedworkers-compensation-claims-head-injuries (last updated Aug. 30, 20 12).
/d.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part liLA.
See Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Mike
Florio, Bruce Matthews Case Gives Players a Path to California Workers
Compensation Benefits, PROFOOTBALLTALK (Aug. 14, 2012, 8:58 PM),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/20 12/08/14/bruce-matthews-case-gives-playersa-path-to-califomia-workers-compensation-benefits/.
Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1110; Floyd Reese, Matthews Represents All that is Good
About the NFL, ESPN,
0

6.
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in California, claiming an array of disabilities that manifested from
injuries sustained during his employment by the NFL. 7 Specifically,
Matthews claimed that he sustained his injuries while playing at
"various" locations over his nineteen year career. 8 In response, the
NFL Management Council filed a grievance against Matthews,
contesting his claims because a provision in his employment contract
provided that all workers' compensation claims would be decided by
an arbitrator under Tennessee law. 9 Accordingly, an arbitrator issued
an award under Tennessee law and ordered Matthews to cease his
claim in California. 10 In response, Matthews filed a claim in the
District Court for the Southern District of California, seeking to
The district court dismissed
vacate the arbitration award. 11
Matthews' claim, whereafter he filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 12
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that Matthews could not claim
benefits under California's statutory workers' compensation regime, 13
but only because Matthews alleged neither any specific injury in
California, nor a need for medical services therein. 14 In so holding,
the Ninth Circuit implicitly established that a player who makes a
prima facie showing that the claimed injury occurred in California
may bring the claim within the state's statutory workers'
compensation regime, which in tum would allow a court to vacate an
otherwise binding arbitration award as a matter of established state
policy. 15
As a result of the holding in Matthews, the future of all workers'
compensation claims in the NFL may be forever changed, impacting
both the players, as employees and potential claimants, and the NFL
itself, as a liable employer. 16 Regarding the players, Matthews asserts
a clear holding that a player must make a ''prima facie showing" that

7.

http://sports.espn.go.com/nfllhalloffame07 /columns/story?columnist=reese_ floyd&id
=2959672 (last updated Aug. 3, 2007).
Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1110.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Jd.
Jd.
ld.
ld.
Jd.
Id. at 1114. California's workers' compensation regime "establishes a rule that an

14.
15.
16.

employee who is otherwise eligible for California benefits cannot be deemed to have
contractually waived those benefits, and an employer who is otherwise liable for
California benefits cannot evade liability through contract." Jd. at 1111.
Jd. at 1113.
See id. at 1114; Florio, supra note 5.
See Rovell, supra note I.

8.
9.
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the claimed injury occurred in California-or the state in which a
player seeks to claim benefits under the governing workers'
compensation regime. 17 On the one hand, this holding seems to
benefit the players, who may now seek to set aside binding arbitration
awards by claiming that a specific injury occurred in a state like
California, which has established public policy that will set aside
arbitration awards and allow an employee to claim additional benefits
under the state's statutory workers' compensation regime. 18 On the
other hand, this holding also presents a potential difficulty for
claimants, namely that the adverse effects of certain injuries may not
manifest for several years, 19 thereby complicating the ability of a
claimant to make the necessary prima facie showing that the injury
occurred in a certain state. 20
Regarding the NFL, the holding in Matthews operates to threaten
the NFL' s financial structure because claimants in an inherently
dangerous profession may seek to avoid the enforcement of
negotiated arbitration clauses and hold the NFL liable for injuries
traced to specific games. 21 Moreover, because the very nature of the
NFL requires players to play in twenty-two states, as well as the
District of Columbia, 22 the holding in Matthews could open the
floodgates of litigation for players claiming injuries in a number of
states. 23 Finally, because the nature of football-related injuries may
take years to fully manifest/4 the NFL could be open to this flood of
litigation, not only from current players, but from former ones as
well. 25
This comment will explore the two-fold effect that Matthews will
likely have on the future of workers' compensation litigation in the
NFL, namely as it relates to the resulting challenges and difficulties
facing both the players, as claimants, and the NFL, as a liable
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

See Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1114.
CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 2804, 3600(a){l), 5000 (West 2011); see Matthews, 688 F.3d at
1114.
See infra Part liLA.
See infra Part N.A.l.
See Rovell, supra note 1.
See NFL Teams, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Sept. 29, 2013)
(classifying teams by conference, division, and city). Specifically, the states with
NFL teams are as follows: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See Rovell, supra note 1.
See discussion infra Part liLA.
See Rovell, supra note 1.
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employer. 26 To provide background necessary to understand the
current state of affairs of workers' compensation litigation in the
NFL, Part II will present a historical analysis of the advent and
development of the statutory workers' compensation regime, as well
as its interplay with professional sports. 27 To provide insight into the
interplay between former players and the future of workers'
compensation litigation in the NFL, Part III will examine the
proliferation of long-term injuries that may not manifest during a
player's career. 28 Finally, Part IV will tie together the extant legal
doctrine and developmental background to elucidate the ambiguous
state of affairs facing both professional athletes and the NFL, while
proposing a potential avenue to resolve this looming instability. 29 In
short, the prevailing goal of this discussion is to highlight the
looming threat facing NFL players and teams, while advocating for
an equitable resolution to ensure the continued financial stability of
the NFL and its affiliates. 30
II.

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ADVENT AND
DEVELOPMENT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
REGIMES, AS WELL AS THE INTERPLAY WITH THE
WORLD OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS BEFORE
MATTHEWS.

The workers' compensation regime, although commonly referred to
as a "system" or "regime," is hardly systematic. 31 Instead, each of the
fifty states and the District of Columbia has its own workers'
compensation system; but even so, these systems do share a number
of overarching characteristics/ 2 which will be analyzed in this
26.
27.

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II. Specifically, this section will provide a general analysis of workers'
compensation law, as well as a focused analysis on the relationship between workers'
compensation law and the world of professional sports before Matthews.
See infra Part III. This section will also explore the legal development of asbestos
litigation in this country, which will act as an analogue to symptoms and injuries that
may not manifest during the course of employment.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Parts II-IV.
See Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, lllO (9th Cir. 2012); JEFFREY
V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1-2 (2d ed. 1989).
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1-2. For example, most systems differentiate among
"types of claims, types of compensation, conditions for coverage, kinds of insurance
coverage available," and other basic administrative and procedural requirements. !d.
at 2. For additional insight into the development of workers' compensation regimes in
the United States, the reader is urged to consider the United States Chamber of
Commerce's publication that analyzes such development on an annual basis. See U.S.
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comment. 33 Professional athletes have a unique place within
workers' compensation regimes and therefore warrant an independent
review of such placement therein. 34 Accordingly, subpart A will
provide a general overview of workers' compensation law, 35 while
subpart B will provide a detailed analysis of the interplay between
workers' compensation regimes and the world of professional sports,
as it existed before Matthews. 36
A.

A General Overview of Workers' Compensation Law

The advent of the workers' compensation regime can historically
be traced to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the
Industrial Revolution effectuated profound changes in the landscape
of everyday employment. 37 Specifically, the Industrial Revolution
gave rise to the proliferation ofheavy and complex machinery, which
carried with it, as an unfortunate but unavoidable corollary, a stark
rise in the number and severity of injuries occurring in the
workplace. 38 Employees seeking redress for their injuries found little
success, as the available mechanisms for recovery, which were rooted
in contract and tort law, were widely considered to be wholly
inadequate methods of compensation. 39
Specifically, tort law
provided few avenues for redress because negligence principles were
generally thwarted by various common law defenses that shielded
employers from liability, while contributory negligence principles
barred recovery if the employee contributed to the resulting injury. 40
Additionally, contract law was not a cognizable avenue for recovery

33.
34.

35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2013 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS (2013)
(providing a detailed comparison between the varying state workers' compensation
regimes).
See infra Part Il.A.l-5.
See Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Squeeze Play: Workers'
Compensation and the Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 95,
104 (1995). Examining the relationship between workers' compensation law and
professional athletics has been widely undeveloped, but this scholarly article provided
invaluable insight into the otherwise sparse analytic field. It is only through the
authors' earlier research that this comment can examine the recent developments that
arose in light of Matthews. See infra Part IV.A-8.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1; Michael A. Bilandic, Workers' Compensation, Strict
Liability, and Contribution in Illinois: A Century ofLegal Progress?, 83 ILL. B.J. 292,
292-93 (1995).
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1; Bilandic, supra note 37, at 292-93.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1.
Bilandic, supra note 37, at 293-94.
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because courts would generally subject an employment contract to
the doctrinal tort defense of "assumption of risk." 41 As such, the
perceived injustice of the prevailing state of affairs created a situation
that begged for change. 42 Accordingly, lobbyists and lawmakers
alike sought guidance from European compensation systems and the
radical workers' compensation movement swept the country. 43
Today, the statutory regime of workers' compensation law exists as
a mechanism by which individuals who are injured during the course
of their employment receive compensation "for their disabilities,
medical costs, and on some occasions, the costs of their
rehabilitation." 44 With the advent of workers' compensation systems
that allow for such claims, legislators were able to achieve three
primary objectives, namely: (1) guaranteed compensation to injured
employees; (2) administrative efficiency and predictability; and (3)
safety enhancement. 45 Essentially, the workers' compensation system
is a synthesis of the aforementioned objectives, as employees who
fall within the statutory regime will receive guaranteed
compensation,46 which imputes a form of strict liability upon an
employer, 47 thereby motivating an employer to take the necessary
steps to prevent employment injuries and promote workplace safety. 48
To effectuate such humanitarian goals, each of the fifty states and
the District of Columbia developed its own statutory workers'
compensation regime. 49 Despite the natural variance that will occur
within these systems, most regimes share a number of common
characteristics, including: (1) types of covered claims; (2) types of
41.

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
4 7.
48.
49.

See NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1 (stating that traditional theories in tort and contract
law were inadequate at providing compensation to injured workers); Bilandic, supra
note 37, at 293; Jane P. North, Employees' Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory
Choice?, 52 TENN. L. REv. 35, 42 (1984) (stating that the doctrine of "assumption of
risk" was prominent in the American court system in the twentieth century and was
used to bar recovery in employment accidents).
Bilandic, supra note 37, at 293.
!d.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 97-98.
This speaks to the first objective of workers' compensation systems, which is to
guarantee compensation for injured employees. Id. at 97.
This achieves the second objective of workers' compensation systems, as guaranteed
compensation will provide administrative efficiency and predictability. !d. at 97-98.
This reflects the third objective of workers' compensation systems, which is to ensure
safety enhancement in the workplace. !d. at 98.
See NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1; Dean M. Hashimoto, The Future Role of Managed
Care and Capitation in Workers' Compensation, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 242 (1996);
Jason M. Solomon, Fulfilling the Bargain: How the Science of Ergonomics Can
Inform the Laws of Workers' Compensation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1140, 1145 (2001).

2014

Workers' Compensation and the NFL

313

compensation; (3) scope of the coverage; (4) various administrative
functions and procedural rights; and (5) employers' rights and
protections. 50
1.

Types ofClaims

"A workers' compensation claim is an application by an
individual . . . for compensation and other benefits for a medical
condition that resulted from work." 51 "The most common type of
workers' compensation claim," and the type that serves as the basis
for analysis in this comment, is the "injury or accident" claim",
which compensates injuries that are actually caused "in the course of
and arising out of employment." 52
2.

Types of Compensation

Because "injury or accident" claim[s]" must generally arise in the
course of employment, 53 workers' compensation statutes generally
only compensate the employee for financial harms resulting from
injury, but not related harm, such as pain and suffering. 54 Most
jurisdictions compensate employees under a number of similar
categories, including temporary and permanent total disability,
temporary and permanent partial disability, scheduled losses, and
change-of-occupation compensation. 55
3.

The Scope of Coverage

Employers who are subject to a specific workers' compensation
regime must also comply with controlling statutory provisions that
provide for mandatory insurance. 56 The faiiure to obtain such
insurance will not act to bar an employee's claim, but will subject the
insurer to various penalties, such as fines or the loss of common law
tort defenses in lawsuits filed by injured employees. 57

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 1-2.
!d. at 2.
!d. at 11-13.
See id.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 99.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 4.
!d. at 5.
!d.
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Administrative Functions and Procedural Rights

To facilitate the mechanisms of the various workers' compensation
systems, administrative agencies were created to conduct hearings,
resolve disputes, and oversee the distribution statutory awards. 58
These agencies provide a salient alternative to adjudication in an
already congested court system, and as such, agencies play a key role
in effectuating an efficient and predictable resolution to each
workers' compensation claim. 59
Procedurally, most states require that notice of injury be given to
either the employer or the adjudicating administrative agency. 60
When states do not require that notice be filed separately from a
claim, the notice period will match the governing statute of
limitations, which is often two years. 61
Evidentiary rules for workers' compensation administrative review
are generally geared towards achieving an informal and expeditious
resolution. 62 These goals are furthered by the narrow scope of
judicial review, which is generally limited to appellate review of the
record under an "abuse of discretion" framework, where reviewing
courts will generally defer to the factual findings and expertise of the
administrative agency. 63
5.

Employers' Rights and Protection

With the rise of the workers' compensation system, employees are
generally given swift and reasonably certain recovery, while
employers receive immunity from lawsuit, provided that they pay the
required workers' compensation insurance premiums. 64 As a result,
an employer cannot be sued for "negligence that results in a
compensable claim." 65 Essentially, the mechanisms of the workers'
compensation regime ensure the exclusivity of the workers'
Recognizing the generally superior
compensation remedy. 66
bargaining power of employers, most workers' compensation regimes
complement the exclusive remedy with an "anti-waiver provision." 67
This waiver proscribes the use of contractual provisions that purport
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 101.
ld
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 7.
!d.
Jd; Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 101.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 7; Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 101-02.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 7.
!d. at 7-8.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 101.
Jd at 100.
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to comprise an employees' right to make a claim under the governing
workers' compensation system. 68
B.

Workers' Compensation Regimes and Professional Athletes

With the proliferation of the workers' compensation regime, where
there are as many systems as there are jurisdictions in this country, 69
it naturally follows that each state varies in its treatment of
professional athletes. 70 Because the NFL currently has teams in
twenty-two states, as well as the District of Columbia/' injured
players may be subjected to a number of varying statutory schemes,
which makes it necessary to elucidate the applicable state laws. 72
Accordingly, subpart 1 will examine the statutory differences that
may affect a player's ability to claim workers' compensation benefits
in a particular state. 73 Subpart 2 will examine the extant limitations
that may prevent an otherwise eligible player from claiming
benefits. 74 Finally, subpart 3 will elucidate the positions of legal
scholars before Matthews. 75
1.

The Relationship Between Professional Athletes and the
Interstate Diversity of State Workers' Compensation Regimes

Among the twenty-three relevant statutory regimes to which the
NFL is subject, 76 it is possible to analyze the systematic treatment of
professional athletes by the following five distinct classifications: ( 1)
systematic silence, (2) systematic inclusion, (3) systematic exclusion,
(4) choice ofbenefits, and (5) statutory set-offdevices. 77
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

!d.

supra note 31, at 1.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 104; Michelle M. Modery, Comment, Injury
Time-Out: Justifying Workers' Compensation Awards to Retired Athletes with
Concussion-Caused Dementia, 84 TEMP. L. REv. 247, 256 (2011); Rachel Schaffer,
Comment, Grabbing Them by the Balls: Legislatures, Courts, and Team Owners Bar
Non-Elite Professional Athletes from Workers' Compensation, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 623, 639-40 (2000).
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Modery, supra note 70, at 256.
See irifra Part II.B.l.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.3.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 104-12. While Carlin and Fairman were the first
scholars to promulgate this list, it should be noted that this list was further developed
in at least two Jaw review comments. See Modery, supra note 70, at 256; Schaffer,
NACKLEY,
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Systematic silence

Because the interplay between workers' compensation law and
professional sports has not been widely analyzed, 78 it is not surprising
that a majority of jurisdictions do not explicitly address the issue of
workers' compensation benefits for professional athletes. 79
Specifically, among the twenty-three jurisdictions that have at least
one NFL team, 80 the following fourteen jurisdictions do not explicitly
mention professional athletes within their workers' compensation
regimes: (1) Arizona, (2) California, (3) Colorado, (4) Illinois, (5)
Indiana, (6) Georgia, (7) Maryland, (8) Minnesota, (9) New Jersey,
(10) New York, (11) North Carolina, (12) Tennessee, (13)
Washington, and (14) Wisconsin. 81
In the absence of an explicit statutory provision, state courts are
called to interpret the governing workers' compensation regime and
determine the availability of benefits to professional athletes
thereunder. 82 In the vast majority of cases, courts hold that athletes
are considered "employees" within the controlling statutory system. 83
Albrecht v. Industrial Commission '84 is a particularly insightful
case that was decided before Matthews. Ted Albrecht was a former
first-round draft pick of the Chicago Bears in 1977. 85 Albrecht
played for five seasons before suffering a career-ending back injury

78.
79.

80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.

supra note 70, at 639-47. Modery's comment included a sixth category called "InState Exclusion," but it is only applicable to Kentucky, which does not have an NFL
team and is therefore beyond the scope of the present comment. See Modery, supra
note 70, at 260; NFL Teams, supra note 22.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Award of Workers' Compensation
Benefits to Professional Athletes, 112 A.L.R. 5th 365 (2003) (providing a collection
and discussion of various state court cases in which the court was called to evaluate
the availability, or lack thereof, of workers' compensation benefits to professional
athletes).
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23-901 {2012); CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 3351, 3351.5 (West
2011); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 8-40-301 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-9-1 to
-2 (West 2008); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/l(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012); IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-9 (LexisNexis 1997); Mo. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-202
(LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.041 (West 2006); N.J.
STAT. ANN.§ 34:15-1 (West 2011); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW§ 2 (McKinney
2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-2 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102 (2008);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§§ 51.08.180 to .181, 51.08. 185, 51.08.195 (West 2010).
Shields, supra note 79, § 1[a].
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 104-05.
648 N.E.2d 923 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
!d. at 924.
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during training camp before the 1982 NFL season. 86 Albrecht began
a travel service business, where his earnings were substantially less
than when he was employed by the Chicago Bears. 87 Albrecht sought
benefits under the relevant workers' compensation regime, 88 but the
trial court affirmed an arbitrator's refusal to provide compensation
under Illinois law. 89 Specifically, the trial court held that "[f]rom the
moment [Albrecht] started playing football, [he] was in a position of
temporary employment, not a career where he could anticipate
continued employment as long as he desired." 90 Moreover, the trial
court concluded that Albrecht was unable to make a sufficient
showing to suggest that "but for" his back injury, he would be
otherwise able to continue his employment with the Chicago Bears. 91
The trial court further concluded that Albrecht could not demonstrate
a change in earning capacity, stating that "[w]here no evidence exists
that [Albrecht] would have continued in his usual and customary line
of employment, earning his pre-injury wages, an award of wage
differential is not appropriate."92
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois
reversed the lower court and remanded the action to allow the
governing workers' compensation commission to enter an award,
pursuant to Illinois law, in favor of Albrecht. 93 The appellate court
noted that an established purpose of Illinois' statutory regime is to
compensate an injured employee for lost earning capacity that arose
because of the employee's injury. 94 As a precondition for such
compensation, Albrecht was therefore required to show that, but for
his injury, he would have continued his career as a professional
football player for the Chicago Bears into the 1982 NFL season. 95
Despite speculation and conjecture from senior management within

86.

87.
88.

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. As an interesting side note, Albrecht was injured while performing a "leap frog"
exercise, during which Albrecht sustained an array of back injuries, including both a
bulging disc and disc herniation. I d.
Id.
See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/l(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012)
(setting
the
amount of compensation that shall be paid to employees for accidental injuries not
resulting in death).
See Albrecht, 648 N.E.2d at 925.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 927.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 926.
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the Chicago Bears' organization, 96 the appellate court held that the
record demonstrated that, before the 1982 NFL season, Albrecht had
started every game of his NFL career, which created a presumption
that, but for Albrecht's injury, he would have continued his career
into the 1982 NFL season. 97 Most importantly, the appellate court
rejected the lower court's finding that professional football players
are "beyond the realm of the skilled worker contemplated" by those
cases awarding compensation under Illinois law. 98 Specifically, the
appellate court concluded that "professional football players are
skilled workers contemplated under the statute and that any shortened
work expectancy in [Albrecht]'s career would not preclude him from
a wage-loss differential award under [Illinois Law]. " 99
Even in those states where dated authority established that athletes
do not fall within the domain of the controlling workers'
compensation regime, 100 modern authority has generally moved to a
broad presumption of inclusion, 101 thereby allowing NFL players to
seek benefits under the relevant workers' compensation regime. 102
Despite the general consensus that professional athletes are wellwithin statutory workers' compensation regimes, there is some
contrary authority that suggests otherwise. 103 Palmer v. Kansas City
Chiefs Football Club 104 is widely considered to be the seminal case
embodying the erroneous point of view that professional athletes are
not within the ambit of the governing workers' compensation
regime. 105 Gery Palmer established himself as an accomplished
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.

101.
102.

103.
104.
105.

Jim Finks, the general manager for the Chicago Bears, stated in an affidavit that each
player is evaluated on a yearly basis and, as such, no player is guaranteed employment
beyond the current season. /d. Furthermore, Finks stated that the average career for
an offensive lineman in the NFL is less than ten years. I d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 927 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Rowe v. Bait. Colts, 53 Md. App. 526, 536, 454 A.2d 872, 878 (1983)
(holding that former defensive tackle David Rowe's arm injury, which he sustained
during an exhibition game with the Philadelphia Eagles, was not within the ambit of
Maryland's comprehensive workers' compensation regime because Rowe did not
demonstrate an "accidental injury within the meaning of the [system].") (alteration in
original), overruled by, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012).
See Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 104-05.
See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 428 Md. 198, 210, 51 A.3d 544, 551 (2012)
(holding that a back injury sustained by former Washington Redskins punter Thomas
Tupa was an "accidental injury" within the meaning of Maryland's workers'
compensation regime, thereby overruling Rowe).
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 106.
621 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 106.
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offensive lineman with the Kansas City Chiefs, but a routine blocking
assignment left Palmer with a back injury that limited his ability to
continue in the course of his employment with the Kansas City
Chiefs. 106 The Missouri Industrial Commission determined that
Palmer's injury was the result of an "abnormal strain," which the law
treats as an accidental physical injury within the scope of Missouri's
workers' compensation regime. 107 The Missouri Court of Appeals
rejected the commission's determination that Palmer's injury was the
result of an "accident" within the meaning of Missouri law. 108 The
court of appeals stated that the entire purpose of the "trap play" is to
enable an offensive lineman to maneuver himself below the pad lever
of the opposing defensive lineman and, in the event that the offensive
lineman fails to properly execute this maneuver, it is likely that the
player will be amenable to injury. 109 The court of appeals therefore
concluded that "[w]hatever strain resulted was an expected incident
of the usual work task done in the usual way." 110 In short, the court
of appeals interpreted the state's workers' compensation regime to
protect against accidental injury, which is statutorily defined to mean
those injuries that result from unexpected events in the usual course
of employment, 111 but which does not contemplate that the
"deliberate collision between human bodies constitutes an accident or
that injury in the usual course of such an occupation is caused by an
unexpected event." 112
Despite the unusual holding proffered by Palmer, 113 it is widely
considered to represent an exception to the general rule that statutory

106. Palmer, 621 S.W.2d at 352-53. Palmer detailed the injury as one involving a routine
blocking assignment, where he was called to drive the defensive lineman from the
path of play. Jd. at 352. On this particular play, however, the defensive lineman was
able to place his pad level below Palmer, which forced him to absorb a striking blow
that sent a numbing sensation throughout his entire upper body. /d.
107. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.020 (West Supp. 2013) (defining "accident" to mean "an
unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of
occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a
specific event during a single work shift"); Palmer, 621 S.W.2d at 353.
108. Palmer, 621 S.W.2d at 357.
109. ld. at 356.
110. /d.
111. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 287.020(2}--(3) (West Supp. 2013).
112. Palmer, 621 S.W.2d at 356.
113. See id. at 356-57.
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silence imbues a presumption of inclusion for professional athletes
within statutory workers' compensation regimes. 114
b.

Systematic inclusion

In a minority of jurisdictions in which the NFL currently has a
professional franchise, 115 the governing workers' compensation
system statutorily includes professional athletes. 116 Specifically, the
following jurisdictions recognize that professional athletes may be
compensated, in varying degrees, under the provisions set forth by
the controlling regime: ( 1) the District of Columbia, (2) Michigan,
and (3) Pennsylvania. 117
Even in those jurisdictions that do provide benefits for professional
athletes, the applicable statute often acts to limit, rather than benefit,
a professional athlete's access to such benefits. 118 For example,
Pennsylvania's workers' compensation regime provides that the
eligibility of professional athletes to seek compensation for any
injury shall be statutorily limited. 119
In Lyons v. Workers'
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.), 120 the
court held that the statutory limitation placed on the ability of
professional athletes to claim workers' compensation benefits did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 121

114. It should also be noted that Missouri's statutory workers' compensation regime now
deals directly with the professional athlete by using a "statutory set-off device." See
infra Part II.B.1.e.
115. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
116. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 107.
117. See D.C. CODE § 32-1508(3)(W) (LexisNexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§418.360 (West Supp. 2013); 77 PA. STAT. ANN.§ 565 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013). It
should be noted that, although Michigan's statutory regime recognizes that athletes
are entitled to seek compensation therein, the statute applies only insofar as the
claimant makes less than 200% of the state's average weekly wage, which effectively
excludes all NFL players. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.360. Accordingly, this
comment will refer to Michigan's regime as providing for both "systematic inclusion"
and "systematic exclusion." See infra Part II.B.1.c.
118. See, e.g., 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 565(c) (providing that compensation payable to
professional athletes shall be reduced by: (1) any wages payable by the employer
during the period of disability under the employee's contractual arrangement; (2) any
payments made by a self-insurance or similar plan funded by the employer; or (3) any
other injury benefits payable as per the express terms of the employee's contractual
arrangement or collective bargaining agreement).
119. See 77 PA. STAT. ANN.§ 565(a).
120. 803 A.2d 857 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
121. See id. at 860-62.
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The commonwealth court applied the "rational basis" tese 22 to
conclude that professional athletes "willfully hold themselves out to
risk of frequent, repetitive and serious injury in exchange for
lucrative compensation," and as such, "the legislature could have
rationally placed a different value on those who risk bodily harm to
provide entertainment from those, such as police officers and fire
fighters, who risk bodily harm to protect society." 123
While such statutory regimes may limit a professional athlete's
access to workers' compensation benefits, 124 the systems also
unequivocally codify a professional athlete's ability to seek
compensation therein, which therefore provides a sense of clarity and
predictability that is otherwise missing in those jurisdictions which
do not address the interplay between professional athletes and
workers' compensation benefits. 125
c.

Systematic exclusion
In stark contrast to the approach of inclusive jurisdictions, 126 some

states have elected to codify statutory provisions that exclude
professional athletes from the governing workers' compensation
regime. 127 Such an approach is often traced to the influential
lobbying of professional franchise owners who are obviously adverse
to the benefits that are provided by workers' compensation
systems. 128 Among those jurisdictions in which an NFL team is
located, 129 only three work to statutorily exclude professional athletes,
namely: (1) Florida, (2) Massachusetts, and (3) Michigan. 130

122. Courts are called to apply the "rational basis" test when a state regulation affects no
sensitive classification, such as race, and impairs no fundamental right. FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). The standard of review over such
classifications is a "paradigm" of judicial constraint, where courts are called to
recognize that legislative regulations are constitutionally endowed with a presumption
of validity, which means that classifications will survive rational basis scrutiny as
long as there is some rational relationship between the regulation and a legitimate
state purpose. See id. at 314-15; Lyons, 803 A.2d at 861.
123. Lyons, 803 A.2d at 862.
124. See, e.g., 77 PA. STAT. ANN.§ 565(c).
125. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
126. See supra Part ll.B.l.b.
127. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 108.
128. /d.
129. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
130. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(17)(c)(3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § l(4)(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§
418.360 (West Supp. 2013).
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Florida's workers' compensation regime soundly represents those
jurisdictions which unequivocally deny benefits to professional
athletes. 131 In pertinent part, Section 440.02 of West's Florida
Statutes Annotated states that "'Employment' does not include
services performed by or as . . . professional athletes, such as
professional boxers, wrestlers, baseball, football, basketball, hockey,
polo, tennis, jai alai, and similar players." 132 Despite the fact that
workers' compensation coverage is generally required for any
employer with a minimum number of employees, 133 Rudolph v.
Miami Dolphins, Ltd. 134 illustrates that Florida courts will uphold the
statutory exclusion of professional athletes from claiming benefits
under Florida's workers' compensation regime. 135 In Rudolph, three
professional football players, Council Rudolph, William Windauer,
and Floyd Wells, sought workers' compensation benefits for injuries
sustained during their employment with the Miami Dolphins. 136 The
appellate court upheld the order denying the availability of such
benefits, holding that "[t]he professional athlete exclusion is not a
wholly arbitrary one." 137 The court noted that players are frequently
amenable to serious injuries, willfully hold themselves out to such
mJunes, and are generally well paid for their services. 138
Accordingly, the court could not conclude that the statutory exclusion
promulgated by the state legislature was an unconstitutional violation
of the athletes' due process right of equal protection under the law. 139
While Florida's statutory regime embodies those jurisdictions
which apply blanket exclusions to all professional athletes, 140
Michigan's regime is organized such that professional athletes are
statutorily included, 141 but systematically or functionally excluded. 142

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 440.02(17)(c)(3).
!d. (emphasis added).
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 5.
447 So. 2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
!d. at 291-92.
!d. at 286-87. Specifically, each player was injured in training camp before the start
of the NFL season, summarily dismissed from the team, and subsequently denied
workers' compensation benefits by the governing workers' compensation
commission. !d.
!d. at 291.
!d.
!d. at 291-92.
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 440.02(c)(3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); see supra notes 127-31
and accompanying text.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 418.360 (West 1999 & Supp. 2013) (providing that a
person who suffers an injury as a professional athlete is entitled to weekly benefits).
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Specifically, Section 360 of Michigan's Worker's Disability
Compensation Act allows a professional athlete to claim benefits
only insofar as the athlete earns less than 200% of the Michigan
average weekly wage. 143 The effect of this provision is to
functionally exclude all NFL players, even those who are far from a
level of "superstar" status, from claiming benefits, because a simple
comparison between Michigan's current state average weekly wage
and the average salaries paid to NFL players exemplifies the reality
that Michigan law has systematically excluded NFL players from the
governing workers' compensation regime. 144 Moreover, this reality is
further realized by a brief examination of the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which establishes base minimum
salaries for players that far exceed the 200% limit placed on athletic
salaries under Michigan law. 145
d.

Choice of benefits

Some jurisdictions have resorted to an alternative method to
resolve the conflict between professional athletes and the governing
workers' compensation regime, namely an election or choice of
benefits method. 146 Among those jurisdictions in which an NFL team
is located, 147 only Texas has promulgated a scheme in which a
claimant has the option to receive benefits under the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act or equivalent benefits under the player's
employment contract or collective bargaining agreement. 148 This
statutory provision is conditioned, however, on the additional
requirement that a player is only entitled to make such an election if
142. See id. (providing that the ability of a professional athlete to claim workers'
compensation is conditioned on the requirement that the athlete's average weekly
wage must be less than 200% of Michigan's average weekly wage).
143. !d.
144. Compare State Average Weekly Wage Chart, WORKERS' COMP. AGENCY,
http://www.michigan.gov/wca/0,4682, 7-191--38774--,00.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2013) (providing that, in 2012, the state average week wage was $860.34), with 200910 NFL Salaries by Team, USA Too AY,
http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/footbalVnfllsalaries/team (last visited Oct. 2,
2013) (providing that, in 2010, the average NFL salary among teams ranged from
$1,410,856 to $2,470,622).
145. See NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 33, § 3
(2011) (stating that, in 2012, the minimum salary to be paid to practice squad players
shall be $5,700 per week).
146. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 110.
147. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
148. TEx. LAB. CODE ANN.§ 406.095 (West 2006).
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the contract benefits are equal to or greater than the benefits provided
under the Texas regime. 149
While it may seem that those jurisdictions adopting a "choice of
benefits" method are doing so to protect injured athletes, some
scholars posit that the statute was actually designed to remove
professional athletes from the governing workers' compensation
regime. 150 Assuming arguendo that this is the case, the Texas statute
explicitly provides that an athlete need only make such an election
when the athlete's contractual benefits are equal to or greater than the
corresponding benefits provided under Texas law. 151 This seems to
suggest that this statutory provision actually works to ensure financial
stability for both professional athletes and their employers. 152

e.

Statutory set-off devices

The final classification that affects a professional athlete's' access
to workers' compensation benefits is through a statutory "set-off'
device. 153 Jurisdictions electing to adopt this mechanism provide
statutory workers' compensation coverage to professional athletes,
but reduce such benefits in direct proportion to the contractual
benefits paid by the employer to the injured athlete. 154 Among those
jurisdictions in which an NFL team is located, 155 only three states
have experimented with set-off devices, namely: (1) Louisiana, (2)
Missouri, and (3) Ohio. 156 In Louisiana, the legislature promulgated a
1993 statute that provided for a traditional set-off device, whereby
employee benefits may be reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis if the

149. !d.
150. See Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at Ill (arguing that the purpose of the Texas
statute is to add professional athletes to the list of those employees who are exempt
from statutory workers' compensation protection, so as to reduce the accrued
expenses of major league sports franchises).
151. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.095. The plain meaning of the statute was further
confirmed by case law. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Hennings, 283 S.W.3d 381,388-89 (Tex.
App. 2008) (holding that, where a professional football player's contractual benefits
were not equal to or greater than those available under the governing workers'
compensation regime, the player need not elect between the choice of benefits).
152. See generally infra Part IV (providing a discussion of a potential equitable approach
to ensure both the adequate protection to NFL players and the continued financial
viability of the NFL).
153. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 111.
154. !d.
155. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
156. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 23:1225(D) (West 2011) (repealed 2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
287.270 (West 2005); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4123.56 (LexisNexis2007).
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injured athlete receives any external wages or benefits. 157 In 2004,
the statute was repealed, 158 but proposed legislation would reenact the
earlier "dollar-for-dollar" off-set device. 159 Missouri employs a setoff device that allows employers to take full credit for any benefits
paid to the injured athlete. 160 Ohio combines the preceding two
systems, providing that any payment made to an athlete will be
deemed to be an advanced payment of workers' compensation
benefits, which in tum will allow the employer to seek future
reimbursement from payments made to the athlete under Ohio's
workers' compensation regime. 161 The purpose and end result of
such regimes is to ensure that benefits paid to professional athletes
will be reduced by those amounts received by the player while under
a contract for hire as a professional athlete. 162
2.

Contractual Provisions and General Statutory Limitations May
Also Work to Limit a Professional Athlete's Access to Benefits
under the Governing Workers' Compensation Regime

The substantive structure of a jurisdiction's workers' compensation
regime is not the only mechanism that can limit a professional
athlete's unfettered access to such benefits. 163 Within the NFL
context, there are two such limitations that warrant greater analysis,
namely: (1) the negotiations and contractual terms set forth in the
player's contract; and (2) general statutory limitations that are
applicable to claims for benefits under the governing workers'
compensation regime. 164
a.

The National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement
and Player Contracts

Some scholars posit that professional football is the most
significant source of analysis in terms of the interplay between
professional athletes and workers' compensation benefits. 165
Specifically, this view is based on the fact that professional football
players make more claims for workers' compensation benefits than
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

§ 23: 1225(D).
!d.
H.B. 617, 38th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (La. 2012).
§ 287.270.
§ 4123.56.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 112.
!d.
!d.; Modery, supra note 70, at 261-62.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 112-13.
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any other athletes, 166 which is traced to the reality that NFL players
are at constant risk of serious bodily injury. 167 Accordingly, the NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and player contracts have
been forced to address this issue. 168
On August 4, 2011, the NFL Management Council and the NFL
Players' Association ratified the current CBA, which elucidates the
complete understanding of the parties on all matters contained within
the 318 page document. 169 Article 41 of the CBA is particular! y
relevant, as it sets forth the default rules, subject to an external
agreement, governing any issues related to workers' compensation. 170
Section 1 provides that a player must be given equivalent contractual
guarantees for workers' compensation benefits to those that must
paid under the state regime in which the NFL team is located; but in
the absence of such a state regime, the NFL team must guarantee
equivalent benefits. 171 Section 4 specifically addresses workers'
compensation offset provisions, providing that no NFL team is
entitled to a "dollar-for-dollar" offset, and is instead entitled only to a
"time" offset, whereby an NFL team that pays an athlete's salary
subsequent to an injury is entitled to a reduction of the number of
weeks of the players' award under the governing workers'
compensation regime. 172
Beyond the CBA, two provisions set forth in a standard NFL player
contract may affect an athlete's access to workers' compensation
benefits. 173 Paragraph 9 governs the team's required response to a
player's injury. 174 In relevant part, under this provision:
Unless this contract specifically provides otherwise, if
Player is injured in the performance of his services under
this contract and promptly reports such injury to the Club

166. !d. at 113 (citing PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 740
(1st ed. 1993)).
167. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 113.
168. See NFL & NFL PLAYERS Ass'N, supra note 145, art. 41, §§ 1-6 (establishing
provisions related to workers' compensation issues); see also id. app. A (providing an
NFL player contract).
169. /d. art. 2, § 4. The current CBA is effective from August 4, 2011 through the final
day of the 2020 NFL year. Jd. art. 69, § 1.
170. /d. art. 41, §§ 1-6.
171. /d.art.4l,§l.
172. /d. art. 41, § 4(i)-(ii).
173. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 113; see NFL & NFL PLAYERS Ass'N, supra note
145, app. A,~~ 9, 10.
174. NFL & NFL PLAYERS Ass'N,supra note 145, app. A,~ 9.
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physician or trainer, then Player will receive such medical
and hospital care during the term of this contract as the Club
physician may deem necessary, and will continue to receive
his yearly salary for so long, during the season of injury
only and for no subsequent period covered by this contract,
as Player is physically unable to perform the services
required of him by this contract because of such injury. 175
Paragraph 10 specifically addresses the issue of workers'
compensation, providing that:
Any compensation paid to Player under this contract or
under any collective bargaining agreement in existence
during the term of this contract for a period during which he
is entitled to workers' compensation benefits by reason of
temporary total, permanent total, temporary partial, or
permanent partial disability will be deemed an advance
payment ofworkers' compensation benefits due Player, and
Club will be entitled to be reimbursed the amount of such
payment out of any award ofworkers' compensation. 176
Carlin and Fairman succinctly explain the result that occurs after
synthesizing the aforementioned material. 177 Essentially, an injured
player will be compensated for the remainder of the current NFL
season, whereafter the NFL team is released from any contractual
obligation to pay the player's salary benefits. 178 While an NFL team
may seek credit, or repayment, in the event that a player receives a
workers' compensation award, Carlin and Freeman explain that the
employer's right to credit applies only to periods that compensation is
provided under the terms of the player's contract, and only insofar as
the player's award is based on temporary, as opposed to permanent,
benefits. 179 The final effect of the aforementioned provisions is to
ensure that a player is duly compensated for an injury arising out of
and in the course of employment, while preventing the player from
175.
176.
177.
178.

!d.
!d. app A, 'lf10.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 113-14.
/d. at 113. It should be noted that the CBA does provide additional injury protection
payments. See NFL & NFL PLAYERS Ass'N, supra note 145, art. 45, § 2 (stating that
an injured player is entitled to receive an amount equal to fifty percent of his salary
for the season following the injury, up to a maximum payment of$1,050,000.00, as of
the 2013-2014 League years).
179. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 114-15.
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receiving compensation by way of salary benefits and workers'
compensation benefits. 180
b.

General statutory limitations applicable to claims for benefits
under the governing workers ' compensation regime

There are two primary limitations that apply to all employees
seeking benefits under the governing workers' compensation regime,
which may bear more heavily on the ability of a professional athlete
to make a claim thereunder. 181 First, every workers' compensation
system is governed by a statute of limitations that controls an
employee's ability to state a claim for benefits. 182 Specifically, there
are two relevant limitations periods that affect an employee's ability
to state an actionable claim, namely: (1) notice of injury and (2)
limitations on a claim for compensation. 183 The notice requirement is
an obvious and necessary method to ensure that the employer can
provide medical treatment and consider an inquiry into the alleged
injury. 184 The limitations period on a claim for compensation is
generally as long as two years, 185 which may seem to be problematic
for professional athletes, whose injuries may not manifest for several
years after their playing careers have ended. 186 That being said, many
jurisdictions have addressed this potential shortcoming by flexibly
extending the statute of limitations to commence only upon the
employee's reasonable realization of the injury, which is known as
the "discovery rule." 187

180.
181.
182.
183.

184.
185.
186.
187.

ld.
Modery, supra note 70, at 261.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 7; Modery, supra note 70, at 261.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 7; Modery, supra note 70, at 261. California law soundly
examples these limitations. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5400 (West 2011) ("[N]o
claim to recover compensation under this division shall be maintained unless within
thirty days after the occurrence of the injury which is claimed to have caused the
disability or death, there is served upon the employer notice in writing, signed by the
person injured or someone in his behalf ... ").
Modery, supra note 70, at 261.
NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 7.
See infra Part liLA.
See, e.g., 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 565 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013) ("[A]ll claims for
compensation shall be forever barred, unless, within three years after the injury, the
parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under this article; or unless
within three years after the injury, one of the parties shall have filed a petition as
provided in article four hereof."); Johnson v. Heartland Specialty Foods, 672 N.W.2d
326, 328 (Iowa 2003); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Louser), 792
A.2d 29, 33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding that, in cases involving cumulative
trauma, the statute of limitations may begin to run on the date of diagnosis).
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Choice of law and jurisdictional provisions may also limit a
professional athlete's access to workers' compensation benefits. 188
Most typically, workers' compensation regimes apply to injuries
arising within the state's jurisdictional boundaries. 189 That being
said, other jurisdictions may promulgate additional requirements for
coverage within the governing regime. 19° For example, California
considers whether the contract for employment was entered within its
boundaries as a factor for coverage. 191 The ultimate effect of the
preceding general statutory limitations is to create another hurdle that
a professional athlete must clear to seek benefits, which may be
especially difficult in situations where the athlete has played for
multiple teams and the athlete's injuries do not manifest for several
years after his tenure with the NFL has terminated. 192
3.

The Position of Legal Scholars before the Holding in Matthews

Despite the general pervasiveness of workers' compensation law
and a plethora of legal analysis, 193 the interplay between workers'
compensation law and professional athletes has been widely
undeveloped by legal scholars. 194 That being said, there are a small
collection of scholars who have elucidated the precarious situation
facing those professional athletes who are often limited in their
access to workers' compensation benefits. 195 These scholars brought
the issues facing professional athletes to the forefront of discussions
188. NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 59-70; Modery, supra note 70, at 262.
189. Modery, supra note 70, at 262. Pennsylvania soundly exemplifies this view. See 77
PA. STAT. ANN.§ 1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013).
190. Modery, supra note 70, at 262.
191. NACKLEY, supra note 31, at 64.
192. See infra Part lii.A.
193. See, e.g., ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW (2013) (providing a comprehensive and authoritative analysis of workers'
compensation law).
194. Bobbi N. Roquemore, Comment, Creating a Level Playing Field: The Case for

Bringing Workers' Compensation for Professional Athletes into a Single Federal
System by Extending the Longshore Act, 57 LOY. L. REv. 793, 795 (2011).
195. See, e.g., Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 117-27 (discussing the tension between
professional athletes and the purported goals of workers' compensation regimes);
Modery, supra note 70, at 269-81 (positing that those professional athletes who suffer
from dementia ought to be able to seek workers' compensation benefits); Roquemore,
supra note 194, at 841-56 (stating that professional athletes should be subject to a
federal system of workers' compensation); Schaffer, supra note 70, at 650-54
(recommending that all state legislatures work to ensure that no professional athlete is
excluded from statutory coverage under the governing workers' compensation
regime).
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surrounding workers' compensation law; yet while such works
advocate for the athlete's seemingly unfettered access to workers'
compensation systems, 196 the looming financial threat facing the
NFL-and other professional sport enterprises-has been widely
disregarded. 197
In 1994, Stephen Carlin and Christopher Fairman endeavored to
resolve the tension between professional athletes and the purported
systematic goals of workers' compensation regimes. 198 Carlin and
Fairman correctly quelled the misconception that workers'
compensation regimes were not designed for professional athletes,
who are thought to assume the risk of injury by engaging in a
dangerous occupation that pays out handsome salaries. 199 Carlin and
Fairman highlighted the fact that workers' compensation regimes
were created with a primary purpose to avoid such common law
defenses as the doctrine of "assumption of risk." 200 Accordingly,
Carlin and Fairman argued that any judicial or statutory restriction on
a professional athlete's access to the governing workers'
compensation regime is both unwarranted and inappropriate. 201
Finally, Carlin and Fairman argued that the scope of contractual
setoffs 202 ought to be limited, and post-recovery suits, filed by those
NFL teams which seek reimbursement for workers' compensation
benefits paid to injured players, ought to be prohibited. 203
In 2000, Rachel Schaffer sought to build upon the foundation laid
by Carlin and Fairman by further dispelling the myth that all
professional athletes earn exorbitant salaries, and recommending that
all state legislatures ensure that professional athletes are covered
within the governing workers' compensation regime. 204 Schaffer
noted that the extant limitations on, and exclusion of, benefits
provided to professional athletes had an incongruent impact upon
female professional athletes, who have lower rates of pay and
increased risks of injury than their male counterparts. 205 With these
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

203.
204.
205.

See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See Rovell, supra note 1.
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 96.
Jd. at 117-18. The scholars also state the reality that, while many professional
athletes are well paid, there are many who are not. !d. at 118.
!d.
!d. at 118-21.
See NFL & NFL PLAYERS Ass'N, supra note 145, app. A,~ 10 (providing contractual
setoff provisions for workers' compensation benefits paid to an injured professional
football player).
Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 121-26.
Schaffer, supra note 70, at 625.
I d. at 650.
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realities in mind, Schaffer argued for unambiguous statutory
inclusion of professional athletes within all workers' compensation
regimes, as well as assurances that no regime can functionally
exclude professional athletes from such benefits. 206 Finally, Schaffer
argued that team owners should not be given the option of whether to
participate in workers' compensation programs, nor should any
agreement provide for any type of setoff scheme. 207
In 2011, Michelle Modery provided the first foray into concussionrelated dementia and the issues facing those retired athletes who seek
Modery acknowledged the
workers' compensation benefits. 208
hurdles facing claimants in a dementia case, but argued that such
cases still fit evenly within the scope of workers' compensation
regimes. 209 Specifically, Modery explained that the availability of
damages for such claimants will tum on several key factors,
including the claimant's ability to: (1) prove a direct link between
past concussions and current dementia; (2) successfully argue that
dementia is an occupational disease; (3) successfully establish
inclusion, as a professional athlete, within the governing workers'
compensation regime; and (4) overcome any equitable considerations
offered by the athlete's former employer. 210 Modery argued that
because workers' compensation is remedial in nature, established
systems should therefore be construed to include the broadest array of
claimants, which indicates that a retired athlete suffering from
dementia should satisfy any requirements for compensation
thereunder. 211
Finally, in 2011, Bobbi Roquemore advocated that a single federal
system may be an appropriate way to address the issues facing those

206.

207.

208.
209.
210.
211.

/d. at 651. Michigan's workers' compensation regime soundly examples those states
that purport to functionally exclude professional athletes from coverage thereunder.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.360 (West 1999 & Supp. 2013) (providing
coverage to professional athletes only insofar as the athlete's salary is less than 200%
of the Michigan average weekly wage).
Schaffer, supra note 70, at 653-54. It should be noted that Schaffer also advocated
for the unionization of non-elite athletes, which is a sound recommendation, but one
that has no bearing on the state of affairs facing the NFL in light of Matthews. See id.
at 654.
Modery, supra note 70, at 248.
/d. at 270.
Jd. at 269.
/d. at 281-82; see also infra Part III (providing a brief foray into long-term injuries
that may not manifest until an athlete's career has ended, which will affect the
player's ability to seek remedial benefits provided under the governing workers'
compensation regime).
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professional athletes who seek workers' compensation benefits. 212
Roquemore is also the first to acknowledge that workers'
compensation may seem, at times, to be excessive in its coverage of
retired players. 213 Roquemore explained that a uniform system for
resolving workers' compensation claims exists at the federal level
through the Longshore Act, 214 which was originally drafted to resolve
the unavoidable jurisdictional issues that prevailed in maritimerelated workers' compensation claims, where covered employees
were injured or killed while navigating interstate waters. 215
Roquemore further explained that the Longshore Act has since been
extended to include other types of employment, including civilian
employees who work on national security-related endeavors while
under contract with the United States government. 216 When the
Longshore Act is extended, each subsequent act sets forth its own
provisions regarding the essential terms of coverage, such as
identifying those employees who are entitled to receive compensation
thereunder. 217
With this in mind, Roquemore suggested that
extending the Longshore Act to include professional athletes, which
Roquemore called the "Professional Athlete Workers' Compensation
Act," would be a sound way to ensure proper coverage for all
professional athletes. 218 Specifically, Roquemore stated that such an
act could carry an array of useful benefits, including: (1) uniformity;
(2) predictability; (3) judicial efficiency; and (4) international
efficiency. 219
Accordingly, Roquemore drafted the proposed
"Professional Athletes' Compensation Act" 220 to provide the
aforementioned benefits and bring clarity to a system that has
otherwise seemed both excessive and inequitable. 221

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Roquemore, supra note 194, at 799-801.
Id. at 795-96.
33 u.s.c. §§ 901-950 (2012).
Roquemore, supra note 194, at 841.
!d.
!d. at 842.
!d.
!d. at 848-52.
!d. at 857-59.
!d. at 856.
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III. THE PROLIFERATION OF LONG-TERM INJURIES THAT
MAY NOT MANIFEST DURING THE COURSE OF A
PLAYER'S CAREER CREATE AN UNCERTAINTY THAT
MUST BE ADDRESSED IN LIGHT OF MATTHEWS
In recent years, scientists began to recognize that brain injuries,
especially those occurring in professional sports, gave rise to an
"emerging silent epidemic" that creates nearly a quarter of a million
new patients each year who exhibit signs of long-term deficiencies. 222
The realization of such injuries among professional athletes has
already created a firestorm of litigation, 223 and when coupled with
other injuries that may not manifest until long after an athlete's career
has ended, the end result is to create a broad uncertainty that exposes
the NFL to the risk of financial instability. 224 The goal of this section
is to shed light on the emergence of such crucial issues within the
context of the NFL. 225 To do so, subpart A will highlight the
development of "the concussion crisis" 226 within the NFL, 227 while
subpart B will provide a brief foray into asbestos litigation to
elucidate the methods used to handle claims made by those
employees whose work-related injuries did not manifest for several
years following the termination of their employment. 228

A. The Manifestation ofLong-Term Injuries in the NFL

Approximately forty-four million children are involved in
recreational and interscholastic sports. 229
An alarming study
published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
suggests that there are between 1.6 million and 3.8 million sportrelated concussions sustained annually. 230 While the seriousness of
brain injuries is finally being realized, scientists and academics alike

222.

LINDA CARROLL & DAVID ROSNER, THE CONCUSSION CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A SILENT
EPIDEMIC xi-xiii (2011).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See infra Part liLA.
Rovell, supra note 1.
See infra Part liLA-B.
See CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 222.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part lii.B.
See CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 222, at 11.
Jd. While the CDC's estimate is certainly a broad range, perhaps this can be traced to
the fact that children and their parents are still mostly unaware of the true dangers
facing today's athletes. See id. at xi (providing a 2010 survey, which found that just
eight percent of parents felt that they had a strong working knowledge of the dangers
facing their children).
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are working against a subculture of players and trainers who have
historically taken head injuries very lightly. 231 It is certainly true that
the phraseology of a player "getting [his] 'bell rung'" was often a
mainstream diagnosis that made light of the likely negative
consequences that could manifest from a brain injury. 232
The reluctance to truly acknowledge the consequences of brain
injuries can be feasibly traced to the difficulties facing those doctors
who examine victims of brain trauma. 233 Specifically, conventional
brain imaging methods, such as MRI machines and CAT scans, will
often show no signs of visible damage. 234 As a result, the only way
doctors can truly determine the adverse effects of a brain injury is by
tracing the victim's deficits, such as short-term memory loss or
cloudy vision. 235
While the rest of the world began to acknowledge the dire
consequences of brain trauma, the sports world was slow to follow. 236
In 2007, the NFL arranged a summit meeting to address the
controversial concussion crisis. 237 Physicians and trainers from all
thirty-two teams were summoned to engage in a heated debate,
wherein the NFL's doctors would defend the view that brain injuries
present minimal risks, and brain injury experts would attempt to
elucidate both the short-term and long-term effects of brain
injuries. 238 While the summit settled few arguments, it represented
the NFL's apparent willingness to listen and respond to critics. 239 In
fact, the same day that the NFL called for the summit conference,
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell, who was serving his first year in
the position, announced novel NFL standards for concussion
diagnosis and management. 240 Borrowing from the system already
established in the National Hockey League (NHL), Goodell
promulgated a number of key procedures, including: ( 1)
neuropsychological baseline testing for every player before each new
season; (2) a requirement that decisions whether to allow an injured
player to return to the field of play would be based solely on health,
as opposed to competitive, considerations; and (3) a "whistleblower"

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

!d. at 10-11.
!d. at I 0.
!d. at 142-43.
!d.
See CARROLL &
/d. at 245.
!d.
/d. at 245-46.
!d. at 248.
!d.

ROSNER,

supra note 222, at 143.
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hotline empowering anyone to anonymously report situations in
which an injured player was forced back into the field of play. 241
Despite the NFL's apparent willingness to address the short-term
and long-term effects of brain trauma, it was still reluctant to
acknowledge the long-term ramifications of brain injuries. 242 In
2009, the NFL commissioned an independent study that finally
pushed the stalemate to a tipping point. 243 In a survey of 1,063 retired
NFL players, University of Michigan researchers found that retired
players over forty-nine years old were five times more likely than
similarly aged non-players to be diagnosed with dementia,
Alzheimer's disease, or similar memory-related diseases. 244
Moreover, retired players between thirty and forty-nine years old
were nineteen times more likely to develop a memory-related disease
than their non-playing counterparts. 245 This sparked congressional
interest, and on October 28, 2009 and January 4, 2010, the House
Judiciary Committee conducted a two-part hearing on "[l]egal issues
related to football head injuries. " 246
During the hearing,
Commissioner Goodell attempted to defend the initiatives taken by
the NFL, including the "88 Plan," which provides up to 88,000
dollars per year to any retired players who has been diagnosed with
dementia or Alzheimer's disease. 247 Moreover, Goodell defended the
NFL's efforts by explaining that the league has developed a number
of benefits for retired players, including: (1) joint replacement
surgery programs; (2) cancer screening; (3) spinal care; (4) assisted
living; (5) discount cards for prescription drugs; and (6) growing
pension plans that extend retrospectively to retired players. 248 In
further defense of the NFL's efforts to curtail the long-term brain
injuries, Commissioner Goodell stated that:
If I have had more than one concussion, am I at increased
risks for another injury? Answer: Current research with
professional athletes has not shown that having more than
241. See CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 222, at 248.
242. /d. at 251.
243. /d. at 251-52.
244. /d. at 252.
245. /d.
246. Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Part I & Jl): Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary H. of Rep., lllth Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Head Injury
Hearings]; CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 222, at 252.
247. Head Injury Hearings, supra note 246, at 29 (statement of Commissioner Roger
Goodell).
248. !d.
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one or two concussions leads to permanent problems if each
injury is managed properly. It is important to understand
that there is no magic number for how many concussions is
too many. 249
This statement would invite a firestorm of criticism, most notably
from Congresswoman Linda Sanchez, who expressed concern that:
The NFL sort of has this kind of blanket denial or
minimizing of the fact that there may be this, you know,
link. And it sort of reminds me of the tobacco companies
pre-1990's when they kept saying no, there is no link
between smoking and damage to your health or ill health
effects. 250
Beyond merely a barrage of admonishments, the hearing also had
its fair share of veiled threats against the NFL. 251 Perhaps the most
scathing threat came from Congresswoman Maxine Waters, whose
husband played in the NFL for six seasons. 252 In her closing remarks,
Congresswoman Waters stated, "I think it is time for the Congress of
the United States to take a look at your antitrust exemption. I think
that you are a, what, $8 billion organization who have not taken
seriously your responsibility to the players." 253
The aftermath of the hearing was stunning as the NFL was
suddenly considered the voice supporting concussion reform. 254
Within a month of the hearing, Commissioner Goodell announced a
series of policies that would impose more stringent concussion
guidelines that were designed to promote the overall safety and wellbeing of all NFL players. 255 Among the policies implemented during
the next two NFL seasons were posters, television commercials, and
independent medical examiners on every NFL sideline. 256
While the NFL's policies are a necessary step in quelling the
concussion epidemic that has overtaken the professional sports world,

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

!d. at 116.
!d. at 116 (statement of Representative Sanchez); CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note
222, at 252.
CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 222, at 252.
!d.
Head Injury Hearings, supra note 246, at 95 (statement of Representative Waters);
CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 222, at 252-53.
CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 222, at 252-53.
!d. at 253-54.
!d. at 254-56, 263-65.
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the NFL's financial stability is far from secure. 257 As of June 21,
2013, 4,400 retired professional football players have joined in 263
lawsuits filed against the NFL. 258 The implication from these
lawsuits is that there is no foreseeable end to those retired players
who will seek compensation from the NFL for long-term effects of
injuries sustained during their NFL career. 259 Coupling this reality
with the holding in Matthews, the financial liability that could soon
follow is one that the NFL may be unable to handle. 260
B.

A BriefForay into Asbestos Litigation261

Asbestos litigation is the longest-running form of mass tort
litigation prevailing in the United States. 262 The litigation first arose
as a result of employees' long-term exposure to asbestos, which is
often attributed to a number of failures by employers. 263 Because the
history of asbestos litigation is so well-established, it provides a
strong contribution to the evolution of all mass civillitigation. 264
Asbestos was widely used in industrial, work, and residential
locales in the early 1970's primarily because of its strength,
durability, and cost-friendly characteristics. 265 Dr. Irving Selikoff of
the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York is credited with
first elucidating the injuries resulting from asbestos exposure, which
can include: (1) mesothelioma, (2) other cancers, (3) asbestosis, and
(4) pleural plaques or thickening. 266 A primary difficultly in dealing
with asbestos litigation is the long latency periods associated with
such injuries. 267 Specifically, it can take between twenty and forty

257. Rovell, supra note 1.
258. Nathan Fenno & Luke Rosiak, NFL Concussion Lawsuits, WASH. TIMES, June 21,
2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/footballinjuries/.
259. Rovell, supra note 1.
260. See infra Part IV.
261. This comment will only examine asbestos litigation insofar as it is a sound analogue
to symptoms or injuries that may not manifest during the course of employment. For
a more detailed analysis into general asbestos litigation, the reader is encouraged to
consider a number of illustrative sources. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL.,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (RAND Corp. 2005) (providing one ofthe most comprehensive
description to date on asbestos litigation).
262. Jd. at xvii. Through 2002, approximately 730,000 individuals have filed an asbestosrelated claim in the United States. /d. at 70.
263. /d. at xvii.
264. Jd.
265. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 261, at 11.
266. Jd. at 12-14.
267. See id. at 15.
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years between the first exposure to asbestos and subsequent disease
manifestation. 268 The long latency periods that are associated with
asbestos injuries necessitated that applicable legal doctrines evolve
accordingly. 269 For example, one of the most significant obstacles
facing claimants in the early years of asbestos litigation was the
applicable statute of limitations. 270 Initially, most legislative regimes
established that the limitations period for an asbestos-related claim
began at the time of initial exposure. 271 Because of the long latency
period of such injuries, the natural result was to bar the majority of
claims. 272 In response, legislatures began to adopt the "discovery
doctrine," wherein the limitations period on an asbestos-related claim
would not begin until the claimant knew or should have known of the
injury.273
The development of asbestos injury litigation has also had a
profound effect on litigation of workers' compensation law. 274
Specifically, courts have generally established that, where an
employee's injury arises out of and in the course of employment, and
the injury is compensable by the governing workers' compensation
regime, the workers' compensation remedy is the sole source of
redress. 275 This necessarily means that an employer is immune from
an independent action filed by the injured employee. 276 Adhering to
such a system is consistent with the stated goals of workers'
compensation systems, namely to provide an injured employee with
expeditious and predictable redress without the need to establish fault
on the part of the employer. 277 Because of the lengthy latency period
associated with asbestos-related injuries, the sole source remedy
applies regardless of the employee's current employment status and
even extends to preclude any independent actions filed by an
employee's surviving spouse. 278 A recognized exception to this rule
is known as the "dual capacity doctrine," which allows an injured

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

/d.
/d. at 24-25.
/d. at 25.
/d.
See id.
See id.
See generally 60 AM. JUR. Trials §§ 39-40 (1996) (examining the relationship
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/d. § 39.
/d.
/d.
/d.

between asbestos litigation and workers' compensation laws).
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employee to essentially "'pierce[]'" the workers' compensation bar"
when the employer fraudulently concealed the risk of injury. 279
With an understanding that asbestos-related claims do belong
within the applicable workers' compensation regime, the far more
vexing issue is establishing the elements of causation, which is
especially difficult because of the lengthy latency period of such
injuries. 280 To put it succinctly, in asbestos-related cases, causation is
established through two main components, namely (1) "proofofrisk"
and (2) "proof of medical causation."281 Essentially, this requires a
plaintiff to establish the necessary elements within each
component. 282 Regarding the "proof of risk," a claimant is called to
establish four primary elements: ( 1) identification of defendant; (2)
identification of a product containing asbestos; (3) demonstration of
exposure to such a product; and (4) demonstration of duration of
exposure. 283 Regarding "proof of medical causation," a claimant
must establish three primary elements: (1) proof that exposure to the
product "'can cause'" the injury suffered by claimant; (2) proof that
such exposure "'did cause"' claimant's injury; and (3) proof that an
external cause was not the '"sole cause" of claimant's injury. 284
While establishing these elements may seem to be a daunting task,
proof of causation has been steadily accomplished at state and federal
trials across the United States. 285
IV. ELUCIDATING THE AMBIGUOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS
FACING BOTH THE NFL AND ITS PLAYERS IN LIGHT OF
THE HOLDING IN MATTHEWS
As a result of the holding in Matthews, the Ninth Circuit implicitly
impacted the future of all workers' compensation claims in the NFL,
affecting both the players, as employees and potential claimants, and

279. ld. § 40; see, e.g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 612
P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980) (holding that exceptional circumstances, such as the fraudulent
concealment of health risks, may impute independent liability upon an employer, even
though the employee's injury is otherwise compensable under the governing workers'
compensation regime). This is a particularly interesting exception in light of
accusations made against the NFL, which charged the league with concealing the true
nature oflong-term injuries among former players. See supra Part liLA.
280. 60 AM. JUR. Trials§ 41.
281. ld.
282. ld.
283. ld.
284. ld.
285. ld.
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the NFL itself, as a liable employer. 286 In order to truly bring these
difficulties to light, subpart A will address those issues facing current
and former NFL players, 287 and subpart B will address those issues
facing the NFL as a potentially liable employer. 288 Finally, subpart C
will reinforce the need for legislatures to ensure that NFL players are
statutorily protected within workers' compensation regimes, while
also ensuring the financial viability of the NFL for the years to
come. 289
A.

Issues Facing Current and Former NFL Players

In Matthews, the Ninth Circuit held that Bruce Matthews failed to
show that his claim was compensable under California's workers'
compensation regime only because he did not allege any specific
injury in California, nor did he allege a need for medical services
therein. 290 In so holding, the court established that a player who
makes a prima facie showing that the claimed injury occurred in
California may bring the player within the states' statutory regime for
workers' compensation, which in tum would allow a court to vacate
an arbitration award as a matter of establish state policy. 291
1.

The Potential Obstacles Arising from Matthews

On the one hand, the holding in Matthews could feasibly present
obstacles for players seeking benefits within a state's statutory
workers' compensation regime. 292 A player must make a prima facie
showing that the claimed injury occurred in the state in which the
player is seeking workers' compensation benefits. 293 The ability of a
player to make the showing required by the Matthews court could be
complicated by the fact that the NFL is truly a national enterprise,
engaging twenty-two states and the District of Columbia. 294 While
some injuries may plainly arise when a player is engaging a certain
state, it is equally clear that some injuries may arise as the result of
repeated trauma or impact, and as such, may not immediately
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

293.
294.

Rovell, supra note 1.
See infra Part IV .A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012).
/d. at 1114.
See id. at 1113-14 (holding that a professional football player must make a prima
facie showing that the alleged injury occurred in the state in which the player is
claiming benefits).
Id.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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manifest throughout the course of a specific game or season. 295
Moreover, the adverse effects of certain injuries, such as head
trauma, may have a latency period that is so lengthy as to extend
well-beyond the end of a player's career. 296 It therefore follows that
the task of making a prima facie showing that an injury occurred in a
certain state could arguably be extremely difficult, if not
impossible. 297
2.

The Foreseeable Benefits of Matthews

While one could postulate that Matthews could present a number of
difficulties to potential claimants, it is more likely that the holding
actually acts to benefit NFL players. 298 Specifically, such players
may now seek to set aside otherwise binding arbitration awards by
claiming that a specific injury occurred in a state, such as California,
which has established public policy that will set aside arbitration
awards and allow an employee to claim additional benefits under the
state's statutory workers' compensation regime. 299
Matthews certainly aligns with the majority view of those scholars
who advocate for a professional athlete's seemingly unfettered access
to workers' compensation systems. 300 An athlete should not be
barred from workers' compensation benefits merely because of a
"trilogy of fallacies" suggesting that all athletes are ( 1) handsomely
rewarded, (2) protected by long-term contracts, or (3) otherwise
barred from benefits because they choose to assume the risk of
injury. 301 Moreover, it is clear that the vast majority of judicial
decisions establish that a player is meant to be included within
governing workers' compensation regimes. 302 Even in those limited
situations in which a court has excluded a player from benefits under

295. See supra Part liLA.
296. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
297. As will be made clear, the potential limitation may be a hurdle that is easily overcome
by effective pleading on the part of the claimant. See infra Part IV.A.2.
298. See Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1113-14 (denying benefits to a former player only because
he failed to allege a specific injury arising in the state of California) (emphasis added).
299. See CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 2804, 3600(a)(l), 5000 (West 2011) (establishing a clear rule
that an employee who is otherwise eligible for California benefits cannot be deemed
to contractually waive those benefits, and likewise, an employer who is otherwise
liable for such benefits cannot establish liability through a contract).
300. See supra Part Il.B.3.
301. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 117-18.
302. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
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the governing regime, 303 subsequent scholarly cnhques have not
hidden the fact that such decisions are plainly erroneous and poorly
reasoned. 304
Matthews also offers protection to those former players who have
developed long-term deficits due to injuries sustained through the
course of the players' career. 305 Despite the contrary view that former
players may struggle to make the showing sufficient to seek benefits
under a state's workers' compensation regime, 306 it is far more likely
that skillful pleading will allow a former player's claim to survive
any motion to dismiss. 307
A former player must first be able to show that repeated trauma
throughout the player's' career caused long-term deficits, such as
dementia. 308 The player will have to do so in three ways, namely: (1)
establishing a causal link between concussions and long-term
deficits; (2) satisfying the causation requirements under the
governing workers' compensation regime; and (3) presenting expert
testimony to show that employment exposed the player to greater
risks than average, everyday life. 309 Notwithstanding the NFL's early
reluctance to acknowledge any relationship between repeated brain
trauma and subsequent long-term deficits, it is practically beyond
debate at this point that there is such a relationship, which necessarily
makes the task of proving causation much easier than it once was. 310
After establishing causation, a player must then be able to classify
long-term deficits as either an injury or occupational disease under
the governing workers' compensation regime, which will enable the
claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 311 Except for rare judicial
303. See, e.g., Palmer v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, 621 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (interpreting the state's workers' compensation regime to protect against
accidental injury, which is statutorily defined to mean those injuries that result from
unexpected events in the usual course of employment, but "which does not
contemplate that the deliberate collision between human bodies constitutes an
accident or that injury in the usual course of such an occupation is caused by an
unexpected event.").
304. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 34, at 119.
305. See Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2012)
(providing that, as long as a former player can make a sufficient showing that an
injury occurred in a specific state, the former player may seek benefits therein).
306. See supra Part IV .A. I.
307. See Modery, supra note 70, at 269-74 (explaining how players suffering the longterm effects of head trauma injuries can successfully prove causation and coverage
within a state's workers' compensation regime).
308. /d. at 270.
309. /d.
31 0. See supra Part III. A.
311. See Modery, supra note 70, at 272.
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decisions that are considered anomalies in legal circles, 312 1t 1s
generally established that such deficits will be considered injuries
within the governing workers' compensation regime. 313 Moreover,
the general rise of "discovery rule" doctrines, which saw a great rise
in prevalence due to asbestos litigation, the limitations period on a
player's claim will only begin when the player knows or should know
of the resulting deficits. 314 Accordingly, it is clear that the holding in
Matthews certainly presents NFL players with an array of benefits
that far outweigh any potential difficulties. 315
B.

Issues Facing the National Football League

While the outlook is altogether bright for current and former NFL
players who seek workers' compensation benefits following
Matthews, 316 the holding operates to threaten the NFL's entire
financial structure. 317 As a result of Matthews, claimants in an
inherently dangerous profession may seek to avoid the enforcement
of negotiated arbitration clauses and hold the NFL liable for injuries
traced to specific games. Moreover, because the very nature of the
NFL requires "employees" to "work" in almost every state/ 18
Matthews could open the floodgates of litigation for players claiming
injuries in a number of specific states. Finally, because the nature of
football-related injuries may take years to fully manifest, the NFL
could be open to this flood of litigation not only from current and
recently retired players, but also from an array of long-retired players
as well.
Essentially, even though Bruce Matthews lost in his claim for
workers' compensation benefits in California, 319 his failure shed light
on the interplay between former NFL players and workers'
compensation law, which sets the stage for future litigants to
successfully make such claims. The Ninth Circuit clearly established
that Matthews did not fail because his contract stated that any claims
were to be governed by Tennessee law; rather, Matthews only failed
312. See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md. App. 463, 481, 14 A.3d 678, 688
(2011), afj'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012).
313. See Modery, supra note 70, at 269-70.
314. See supra Part Ill. B.
315. SeesupraPartiV.A.l-2.
316. See supra Part IV.A.2.
317. Rovell, supra note 1.
318. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
319. See Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2012)
(denying workers' compensation benefits to Bruce Matthews).
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because he did not allege a specific injury in the state of California. 320
Had he done so, the court could have invoked the public policy set
forth in California law, 321 which allows courts to set aside otherwise
binding "choice of law" contractual provisions and award workers'
compensation benefits under the governing regime. 322 In short,
Matthews has opened the door for any number of former NFL players
to show that a tangible injury was incurred in California, which may
allow the player to override an arbitrator's award, and otherwise
binding contractual provisions, and seek benefits under California's
favorable workers' compensation regime. 323 It is this reality that
exposes the NFL to a very real and very significant threat of financial
turmoil, as the changing types of workers' compensation claims filed
could result in NFL teams incurring liabilities that approach millions
of dollars annually. 324
C.

A Call for Resolution

Football is an inherently dangerous sport, yet the call of courts and
scholars alike is clear: Professional athletes, and particularly NFL
players, belong within statutory workers' compensation regimes. 325
While few scholars have addressed the threat that unfettered access to
such systems could have on the liable employing enterprises, 326 the
reality is that uncontrolled access to benefits could bring financial
ruin to the NFL. 327 Accordingly, this comment urges legislatures and
all those involved to work towards an equitable resolution to ensure
both the continued safety of all NFL players and the continued
viability of the NFL and its affiliates.
This comment previously examined the profound impact that
asbestos injury litigation has had on the overall system of
compensation under statutory workers' compensation regimes. 328
Specifically, reviewing courts have consistently held that the
320. !d.
321. See CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 2804, 3600(a)(1), 5000 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013)
(establishing a clear rule that an employee who is otherwise eligible for California
benefits cannot be deemed to contractually waive those benefits, and likewise, an
employer who is otherwise liable for such benefits cannot establish liability through a
contract).
322. !d.
323. See Rovell, supra note 1 (stating that California is a favorable jurisdiction for former
players because it is the only jurisdiction that provides for cumulative trauma cases).
324. !d.
325. See supra Part II.B.3.
326. See supra Part II.B.3.
327. Rovell, supra note 1.
328. See supra Part III.B.
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workers' compensation remedy is intended to be the sole source of
redress for an injured employee. 329 Such holdings align with a central
premise underlying workers' compensation law, which is to
compensate those employees who are injured in the course of their
employment. 330 With this in mind, it is easier to accept that
professional athletes belong within the worker's compensation
framework, yet there is continuing debate as to the best way to
resolve the conflict between professional sports and workers'
compensation law. 331 While there may never be a perfect solution,
this comment aligns with Roquemore's call for providing a single
federal system to resolve all workers' compensation claims filed by
professional athletes. 332 As it stands now, NFL teams are facing
financial uncertainty and have no idea what the future will bring. 333
Adopting a single federal system to resolve all workers'
compensation claims filed by professional athletes would bring
uniformity, predictability, and efficiency to an otherwise
unpredictable system that sometimes seems excessive and sometimes
seems inequitable. 334 The need for such a uniform federal system is
clear because of the very nature of the NFL, namely that its structure
requires players to engage twenty-two states, as well as the District of
Columbia, 335 all of which have their own unique statutory regime for
workers' compensation. 336 Beyond this, players do not simply
engage one jurisdiction during the course of their career; rather, the
format of NFL scheduling, as well as the possibility that a player may
frequently change teams, requires players to travel to an array of
different jurisdictions. 337 Finally, the nature of the sport itself
subjects its players to the inherent risks for the very injuries that
workers' compensation regimes were created to address. 338 In short,
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

335.
336.
337.
338.

See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
See supra Part ll.A.
See supra Part ll.B.3.
Roquemore, supra note 194, at 841.
Rovell, supra note 1.
See Roquemore, supra note 194, at 848-52 (providing a list of benefits that a single
federal system could bring to the conflict between professional sports and current
workers' compensation claims).
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra Part Il.A (stating that the statutory regime of workers' compensation law
was created to avoid various doctrinal defenses, such as "assumption of risk," which
purport to preclude injuries sustained by employees in the course of inherently
dangerous professions, and provide benefits to all injured employees).
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a single federal system is perhaps best able to effectuate the true
purpose of workers' compensation benefits, which is to provide
economic stability to injured employees. 339 Until such a time as a
resolution can be found, both the NFL and its players will be
continually entrenched in the labyrinth of varying workers'
compensation regimes, and the NFL should certainly expect a
number of former players to seek cumulative trauma benefits in a
state in which they infrequently engaged many years, if not decades,
ago.34o
V. CONCLUSION
Professional football is, like all contact sports, inherently
dangerous, where players willfully subject themselves to repeated
trauma on a weekly basis. 341 Despite the risks facing all professional
football players, nothing prevents them from seeking benefits under
statutory workers' compensation regimes-nor should it. 342 That
being said, the availability of such compensatory benefits creates a
looming threat to the continued financial viability of the NFL. 343 The
liability from workers' compensation claims may sometimes be
minimal, but the proliferation of long-term deficits, which may not
manifest until long after a player's career has ended, 344 threatens to
increase the total liability of NFL teams from thousands of dollars to
millions of dollars annually. 345
This comment seeks to elucidate the ambiguous state of affairs
facing both NFL players, as potential claimants/46 and the NFL itself,
as a potentially liable employer. 347 Specifically, the first goal of this
comment is to highlight the development of workers' compensation
law and its interplay with the world of professional sports, 348 as well
as the rise of long-term deficits in former NFL players. 349 This
comment hopes to highlight the impact that Matthews will have on
the aforementioned interactions, while advocating for legislative
resolution that will ensure both the security of professional football
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
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349.

NACKLEY, supra note 31, at I.
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Modery, supra note 70, at 281.
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!d.
See supra Part liLA.
Rovell, supra note I.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part liLA.

2014

Workers' Compensation and the NFL

347

players and the continued financial viability of the NFL. 350 Until that
time, the state of affairs facing the NFL and its players is the same as
the mental state of a concussed player: cloudy and uncertain.
Thomas J McQueeney*
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J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2014. This comment is
*
dedicated to my parents, John and Kathy McQueeney, and my brother, Christopher
McQueeney. I would also like to thank Professor J. Closius for his insight and
guidance during the drafting process.

